Albania

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Croatia

Kosovo*

Montenegro

North Macedonia

Serbia

Political violence in the Western Balkan region is of low intensity. Out of seven cases that BPI covers, only Kosovo fits the category of the medium intensity of political violence, while all other entities fit into the ‘low intensity’ group. In terms of conflict, Kosovo is affected by the violent political crisis, whereas the others are dealing with political disputes or non-violent crises. Limited and full wars (high intensity of violence) are absent in this region.Other indices, such as Global Peace Index (GPI), confirm our assessment of political violence intensity in the region. GPI ranks all Western Balkan countries and territories as peaceful. Croatia (15th) belongs to the group of the 15 most peaceful countries in the world (very high state of peace). North Macedonia (36th), Albania (41st), Montenegro (48th), Serbia (53rd), and Bosnia and Herzegovina (58th) are included in the second group of ‘high state of peace’ countries. The territory of Kosovo (71st) is the only case covered by the Balkan Peace Index that belongs to the third group of ‘medium state of peace’. Although mostly peaceful, notwithstanding Croatia, all these countries and territories have a medium conflict potential. That is to say that space for further escalation exists and that these mostly nonviolent conflicts can spark violence. This region is affected by two types of conflict ‒ political (over political power) and ethnic (over identity and territory). Serbia is struggling with the secessionist conflict over Kosovo and the conflict between the government and the opposition. North Macedonia and Montenegro are also affected by ethnic (Macedonians vs Albanians, Montenegrins vs Serbs) and political struggles. Albania is free of ethnic conflicts, although deeply divided between the ruling regime and the opposition. A specific institutional design of Bosnia and Herzegovina (two entities, three constitutive peoples, consociational democracy) makes monopolising all the power in the hands of only one political group impossible. Paradoxically, ethnic divisions and ethnicisation of political issues make Bosnia and Herzegovina more pluralist (at least three interpretations of each issue) than other countries in the region. For that reason, inter-ethnic conflicts in Bosnia are more frequent and intensive than intra-ethnic or non-ethnic (political). As for Croatia, its ethnic conflict with the Serbian minority is of low potential since Serbs make up only 3% of the population in this country, and their representatives are integrated into the Croatian regime. Political disputes between the government and the opposition do not have the potential for violent escalation as well.Nonetheless, we evaluated radicalisation and extremism in Croatia as having a medium impact on society. The Serbian minority has been constantly discriminated against since the 1990s and the beginning of the Yugoslav wars, which led to the normalisation of anti-Serb narratives in the public discourse of Croatia. The medium impact of radicalisation is also identified in the cases of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Kosovo. Serbia and North Macedonia are categorised as ‘low impact’ countries, although they are on the verge of moving to the next group on the impact scale.Serbia and Kosovo are the only two cases with medium intensity of political terror (insecure polities). The Serbian government has typical characteristics of an authoritarian regime, such as terror and oppression against the opposition, civil society organisations, and media. The situation in Kosovo is somewhat different since its government is not as oppressive against the political opposition as against the Serbian minority and their representatives. In general, Kosovo is a specific case given that it is the only entity included in the BPI whose sovereignty is disputed by Serbia and more than 90 UN members (including two permanent members of the UN SC). Furthermore, Kosovo is the sole case with a medium intensity of political violence in the region, mainly due to its secessionist conflict with Serbia and oppression against the Serbian minority.

Armed conflict is the most destructive form of political violence, while its absence is the minimum condition for peace. Under armed conflicts, we understand “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory over which the use of armed force between the military forces of two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, has resulted in at least 25 battle-related deaths each year” (UCDP 2014). This domain also covers the assessment of armed conflict risks or the possibility for an armed conflict to erupt. Furthermore, it includes other violent acts, such as armed rebellions, inter-communal violence, or violent incidents between the states since they can serve as a prelude to an armed conflict. The indicator measures the intensity of existing armed conflicts and the potential for future armed conflicts. It includes relevant indices and their assessments, as well as the assessment based on the analysis of political discourses in the region. It is divided into two sub-indicators: conflict intensity and conflict potential. Sources: Conflict Barometer (https://hiik.de/conflict-barometer/?lang=en) Global Peace Index (https://www.visionofhumanity.org/maps/#/), the following indicators: Intensity of organised internal conflict Violent demonstrations Political instability Number of deaths from organised internal conflicts Internal conflicts fought External conflicts fought Number of deaths from organised external conflicts INFORM Risk Index (https://drmkc.jrc.ec.europa.eu/inform-index/INFORM-Risk) Current conflict intensity Projected conflict risk Fragile State Index (https://fragilestatesindex.org/) Group grievance Factionalized elites External intervention Government, NGO and media reports

The political terror domain includes all violent acts directed against “the physical integrity of the person by agents of the state” (Haschke 2021), such as torture and cruel treatment, unlawful use of deadly force, political killings, assassinations, etc. This domain covers different violent acts that are not related to armed conflicts, such as violent suppression of political demonstrations or violent repression against the political opposition. This indicator assesses the intensity of state violence against its citizen, primarily political opposition, dissidents, and similar social agents. It is mostly based on existing data sets supplemented by discourse analysis. Sources: Conflict Barometer Political Terror Scale (https://www.politicalterrorscale.org/) Global Peace Index Violent demonstrations Political instability Political terror scale Fragile State Index Group grievance Government, NGO and media reports

Extremism is usually understood as “the advocacy of a system of belief that claims the superiority and dominance of one identity-based ‘in-group’ over all ‘out-groups’, and propagates a dehumanizing ‘othering’ mind-set that is antithetical to pluralism and the universal application of Human Rights” (ISD 2020). For the purpose of BPI, we only focus on extremism that advocates the use of violent means, i.e., violent extremism. Terrorism, a closely related term, can be defined as “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation” (GTD 2021). This indicator measures the intensity of this form of political violence through the mapping and counting of violent extremist/terrorist incidents and the fatalities and injuries they caused. Sources: Global Terrorism Index (https://www.visionofhumanity.org/maps/global-terrorism-index/#/) Global Terrorism Database (https://www.start.umd.edu/data-tools/global-terrorism-database-gtd) Fragile State Index Factionalized elites Group grievance Global Peace Index Impact of terrorism Western Balkan Securimeter (https://www.rcc.int/securimeter/) National security and defence strategies, government and NGO reports, media reports

Regional and international relations in the WB region in 2022 were overall fair. The increase in non-armed interventions mostly influenced the assessment. Both regional actors and great powers intervened through proxies and foreign policy pressures. As for regional relations, the WB highly depends on ethnopolitics. This means the unresolved territorial disputes from the breakup of Yugoslavia are based on either a demand that ethnic and political units should be congruent or on a demand that the ethnic principle should not be the sole criterium for establishing political units. We relate a couple of processes to this issue: the ongoing secession of Kosovo; mutual ethnic antagonisms in Bosnia and Herzegovina; the tendency to promote territorial pretensions toward the neighbouring states (e.g., Greater Albania); disputes about the rights of institutions related to a particular ethnic group (mainly related to orthodox churches in North Macedonia and Montenegro and Croats in BiH). Although there was an agreement in late 2022 between Prishtina and Belgrade about the mutual recognition of license plates, Kosovo remains the most critical issue for peace in the WB. The potential for escalation into an armed conflict was high in August and December when Serbs in northern Kosovo blocked the main roads as a reaction to what they deemed unnecessary violence and fear politics conducted by the government in Prishtina. Although the clashes ended up with verbal guarantees by the mediators (the USA and the EU) that Serbs would not face any more illegitimate actions by the Albanian side, the crisis extended into 2023 as well. The crisis in Kosovo spilt over to BiH, where Serbs demanded the same principle to be applied there as well, which means the right to secession based on ethnic dominance in the entity of Republika Srpska. Croatia also extended its influence in BiH in 2022 through the EU and the OHR, when the latter imposed a new election law, which the Bosniak political elites deemed unfair and unconstitutional. On the positive side, there was a significant reduction in tensions in North Macedonia in 2022, after the Macedonian Orthodox Church gained independence from the Serbian Orthodox Church and a reduction in tensions in Montenegro (in terms of external politics) after the government signed a “Fundamental Agreement” with the SOC. These two events, together with establishing the “Open Balkan” initiative between Albania, North Macedonia, and Serbia, are why the regional cooperation was on a medium level instead of poor. Finally, the war in Ukraine significantly influenced the complicated ethnoterritorial dynamics in the region, as great powers perceived the entire WB through the potential for proxy conflict with each other. Therefore, there were foreign policy pressures by the EU and the US to impose sanctions against Russia (on Serbia and BiH), and there were also constant attempts to discredit Serbian (or Serbian proxy) politics in Kosovo, Montenegro, and BiH as being pro-Russian. Also, the ethnic instability was a chance for Russia to influence the politics in the region and divert attention from the intervention in Ukraine.

This indicator considers the influence and impact of regional actors in the functioning of a researched entity. As a state can both intervene in other states’ affairs and itself be an object of intervention, we divide this indicator into two sub-indicators: state as a subject of intervention and; state as an object of intervention. Measuring methodology: Qualitative assessments of a team of social science researchers’ independent reviews of each country and territory based on key events from a year compared to the previous one. We consider the locally-based qualitative assessments to be a comparative advantage of the BPI since a local researcher is more immersed in local media practices and knowledge hubs and can recognize means of interventions often invisible to the region’s outsiders. Additionally, the regional intervention indicator has 5 potential predefined values spanning from war all the way to positive peace, defined as harmonious relations. The values for regional external intervention and its sub-indicators are: military aggression and occupation (1– exists, 0 – does not exist); foreign policy pressure (economic, political etc. sanctions, blackmails…) AND pressure through proxies (political, economic etc.) (1 – exists, 0 – does not exist); foreign policy pressure OR pressure through proxies (1 – exists, 0 – does not exist); public propaganda pressure (through own media) (1 – exists, 0 – does not exist); harmonious relations. Sources: national and international media reports, national official documents, and expert analyses.

This indicator considers the influence and impact of regional actors in the functioning of a researched entity. However, its pre-defined values are different from the I1 values, as cooperation is a qualitatively very different state from oppression. Measuring methodology: Qualitative assessments of a team of social science researchers’ independent reviews of each country and territory based on key events from a year compared to the previous one. The regional cooperation indicator has 5 potential values for each state or territory: countries isolated from each other (1 – exists, 0 – does not exist): formal existence of regional cooperation institutions but misusing them as FP proxies (1 – exists, 0 – does not exist); formal existence of regional cooperation institutions without the actual political consequences OR opting out of the institutions (1 – exists, 0 – does not exist); regional cooperation institutions serve as means of creating policies (1 – exists, 0 – does not exist); regional institutions benefit cooperation and serve as means of harmonizing relations (1 – exists, 0 – does not exist). Sources: national and international media reports, national official documents, expert analyses

As the politics, economies, culture, and diplomacy of the six Western Balkans states and territories are often highly dependent on relations with great powers, we find this indicator to be of crucial importance for measuring peace in the region. This indicator will consider the influence, and impact of great powers in the functioning of a researched entity. Measuring methodology: The entire methodology from the regional intervention indicator will be applied to I3 as well. However, since it is highly unlikely that the WB states could be subjects of intervention when it comes to great powers (USA, EU, Russia, China), I3 will only consider the WB states and territories as potential objects of great powers’ intervention. Sources: national and international media reports, national official documents, expert analyses

Overall, the countries of the Western Balkan have medium or low state capacity. The main reasons for this are conflicts that took place in the 1990s and early 2000s and the simultaneous transition from socialist to capitalist economies.Regarding state capacity, Croatia has shown the most significant progress in the region, mainly due to its reforms related to EU accession. However, there are areas where Croatia can still make significant improvements, one of which is resolving border disputes with most of the surrounding countries.Serbia, Montenegro, and North Macedonia follow Croatia’s trend with limited success. These countries perform well on many indicators but also have unaddressed problems. When it comes to Serbia, the biggest issue is the territory of Kosovo, where Serbia does not have any effective control. This is followed by border issues with other countries and internal contestation of its sovereignty in the south of Serbia. Serbia has also experienced increased inequality recently and is not developing instruments to address this issue. Similarly to Serbia, Montenegro still needs to resolve its border issue, although to a lesser extent, and to increase its capabilities for wealth redistribution and support of vulnerable groups. The same applies to North Macedonia.Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina are countries with low state capacities. This can be attributed to violent conflicts and failed transitions. In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the score is highly correlated with the presence of foreign troops, the border demarcation issues, and internal state contestation. Like many other countries in the region, it also needs to improve its capacity for redistribution and support for vulnerable groups. In the case of Albania, the biggest problem represents the lack of ability of the state to provide adequate healthcare and education to its citizens.Due to its internally and externally contested sovereignty, Kosovo has the lowest state capacity. This is reflected in other sectors, such as education and health, where Kosovo scores low on the state-capacity scale. Although the recognition process is most important for Kosovo, reforms in other sectors also need to be significantly addressed.

Support for vulnerable groups represents the capacity of the state to provide basic welfare for vulnerable groups and to prevent their social exclusion. The indicator assesses the capacity and outreach of state welfare programs to those groups that are recognised at marginalised in one society. Measuring methodology (sources): Roma - % living in poverty; % without primary or secondary education; % unemployed; Children - no. of residential homes; % of children living in institutions; % children living in foster homes, % children receiving social assistance; Elderly - % of elderly (65+) living with the minimum or no pension; % of elderly receiving social assistance; No. of refugees, no. of internally displaced persons, no. of migrants % of social assistance (of total GDP) Source: UNICEF, Mics 6, World Bank, Western Balkans countries statistical offices

State provisions represent the capacity of a state to provide basic services to all of its citizens and redistribute wealth inside its society. Measuring methodology (sub-indicators): Redistribution - Gini; progressive taxes (current state); Health - % coverage of basic health insurance, % of heath (of total GDP) Education: % of people with primary education, % of people with secondary education, % of people with higher education, % of education (of total GDP) Sources: World Bank Poverty and Inequality Platform, Western Balkans countries’ statistical offices, Eurostat, Ministries for education, Ministries for welfare and social security. World Bank indicators, Human Development Index, etc.

The capacity of the state to control and to impose laws on its territory Measuring methodology (subindicators): Border – issues with neighbouring countries on the demarcation of the state border; Sovereignty - no. and type of internal groups that are disputing state control over part of its territory; Military – the presence of foreign troops in the country. Source: Ministries of Foreign Affairs, national legislations (WB constitutions), international agreements (Dayton, Kumanovo, etc.), Failed State Index, etc.

The region performed poorly in terms of environmental sustainability not only overall but also for each indicator. To begin with, the natural resources resilience indicator provided several important insights that should be open to further analysis and research. Given that the entire region is one of the most severely affected by climate change in Europe (the European Commission even estimates that the region might experience temperature increases of 1.7–4.0°C and depending on the global effort in GGE reduction even exceed 5.0°C by the end of the century), it is no surprise that the resilience of natural resources is already declining. Decisive and timely policies to prevent further loss of biodiversity must be implemented, especially against the backdrop of the RCC's conclusion on the further northward proliferation of subtropical climate. However, the overall poor state of waters, species, and tree cover reveals that there is no strong political will, nor commitment to safeguarding the resilience of these life-supporting systems for now, except in Croatia. Water risks remain high not only due to more frequent droughts and flash floods but also because of the alarmingly low wastewater treatment, notably in Serbia, North Macedonia, and Albania. The entire region experiences significant deforestation tendencies that should be of enormous concern given the importance of forest areas and tree covers in tackling climate change and the preservation of biodiversity levels. Furthermore, air quality seems to be at an all-time low. Citizens of the Western Balkans are being exposed to severely unhealthy air pollution quite more than citizens of other parts of Europe (EEA confirms that due to high concentrations of suspended particles in the air, generated by the outdated coal industry and individual combustion plants, over 4,000 people die prematurely in the Western Balkans every year). The RCC estimated the cost of burning coal in terms of health and lost productivity at around €11 billion per year, which includes harm in neighbouring EU member states. The situation is daunting in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, and Montenegro, where political elites avoid discussing this issue. Of all the components of the domain, air quality, if it continues to be avoided as a problem and further deteriorates, has the serious potential to trigger mass protests and civil unrest and undermine peace.Lastly, the current tensions surrounding the war in Ukraine, which led to a substantial increase in the prices of electricity and derivatives, affected the performance of the energy systems in the region. Once again, the question of sufficient energy supply was raised as a matter of profound national and geostrategic priority not only in the EU27 but also in the Western Balkans. The WB governments put energy security, which is just a fraction of the energy performance indicator, considerably higher than any other component of the environmental sustainability domain on their political agenda in 2022. Apart from these international currents, energy system performance was evaluated as high only in Albania and Croatia due to diversified industries and a higher percentage of renewables in total final energy consumption.

The I1 measures a country's relative capacity to ensure the resilience of natural resources that are highly affected by climate change, such as species, water, and trees. Measuring methodology (sources): Species protection Water risks Tree cover loss Sources: Map of Life index, Ecological threat register, Environmental Performance Index, NGO reports, reports of international organizations, and state audit institutions.

The I2 measures a country's relative capacity to achieve recommended air quality levels and reduce the impact of air pollution on human health. Measuring methodology (sub indicators): Outdoor Air Pollution Greenhouse gas emissions per capita Sources: Social Progress Report, Environmental Performance Index, Health Effects Institute reports, reports of international organizations such as UNEP, WHO, and (where possible) IPCC.

The purpose of this indicator is to assess the country's relative ability to meet current and future energy demands and provide environmentally responsible energy to its citizens. Measuring methodology (sources): Energy Security Usage of clean fuels and technology for cooking Energy Sustainability Sources: World Energy Trilemma index, SDG 7.1.2, SDG 7.2.1., NGO reports (RES Foundation), state audit institutions.

Fighting crime in the Western Balkans remains a serious impediment to regional peace, security, and development. The overall capacities, efforts and results in fighting crime have been estimated as poor in four out of seven countries/territories in the region for the reported period, with the rest three having only moderate success. While Croatia does stand out in progress made, the entire region remains susceptible to all kinds of crimes, from conventional, via organized to state crime. Post-conflict legacy, political instability, inter-ethnic tensions, and, above all, poverty and lack of employment opportunities keep the region in a vicious circle in which criminality does not allow any significant progress in the consolidation of the peace and development on the local, national, and regional level.Perhaps counterintuitively, the Western Balkans does not suffer from high rates of conventional crime, with an average regional homicide rate being lower than European in 2022. Nevertheless, what still drags the region down is the scale and nature of transnational organized crime spreading in different directions along the historical trafficking routes from Asia to Western Europe. Despite the promising rhetoric, none of the governments in the region made significant progress in downsizing the level of drug, arms and human trafficking or money laundering on its territory. Moreover, the embeddedness of state actors and politicians in criminal networks remained obvious across the region during the reported period. The fight against corruption and organized crime was rather mild, unsystematic, and determined by election cycles. The already visible consequences of the ongoing global outbreaks of violence and the turmoil in the constellations of global powers warn that the situation could get even worse regarding the detrimental nexus between politics and organized crime in the region. Regarding the capacity for fighting crime, states in the region also suffer from similar weaknesses, primarily related to the lack of a strong, effective, and independent judiciary. Again, while the situation differs to some extent among the states, the judiciary in the region has yet to be set free from external interference by politics or business. While some high-level corruption trials were started in the region throughout 2022, most continued to drag on or ended with unsatisfactory outcomes. Such levels of corruption in the judiciary, but also throughout the public sector, continue to hamper every country’s full potential of human and material resources for fighting crime - resources that, while not always abundant, have, in most cases, become solid thanks to two decades of international assistance in this regard. The overall democratic backsliding in the region has, however, additionally weakened the regional capacities for fighting crime during the reported period since the law enforcement agencies and security sector actors become among the first to be ‘captured’ by the ruling parties. Finally, and this may also come as a surprise, people in the Western Balkans region appear to assess the crime situation somewhat independently of how safe they feel. The citizens of all the observed countries/territories feel relatively safe, sometimes even more so than residents of the European nations with the lowest crime rates, even though they believe that political elites and organized crime have corrupted and captured law enforcement agencies. At this moment, the citizens’ anger is primarily directed towards the judiciary and prosecutors, while their trust in police remains decent. While the predominately traditional political culture plays a significant part in this, in ethnically divided countries, the feeling of safety and the degree of trust in law enforcement authorities tend to follow the lines of ethnic divisions.

The purpose of this indicator is to assess the nature and level of the existing crime threats in a country as they stand at the current time. Some of the relevant data: Violent crime rates (homicide, gender-based violence, property crimes, etc.) Organised crime (drugs trafficking, human trafficking, weapon trafficking, etc.) State Crime (crimes by security apparatus, high-level corruption, financial crimes, etc.) … Some of the sources: The World Bank, UNODC - Crime Trends Survey, SEESAC, etc. i.e. violent crime, organised crime, state crime

The purpose of this indicator is to assess whether the resources devoted to fighting crime in a country is sufficient and adequately used to deal with the existing levels and types of crime threats on a day-to-day basis, as well as to act as a deterrent for criminal activity in the long run. Some of the relevant data: Number of police officers per 100,000 people Number of military personnel per 100,000 people Number of private security contractors per 100,000 people Budgetary allocations for the security sector Quality of democratic and civilian governance Criminal justice effectiveness Security Sector Corruption Perceptions … i.e. human resources, material resources, democratic governance Some of the sources: UNODC - Crime Trends Survey, IISS - Military Balance, Small Arms Survey, national statistics, EU progress reports, etc.

The purpose of this indicator is to assess whether the security apparatus acts in the best interest of the country and its citizens, measured by citizen perceptions. Some of the relevant data: Citizens’ perception of safety in communities Citizens’ confidence in the police, judiciary, military … Some of the sources: NGO/IO reports, national surveys, etc. i.e. safety perceptions, trust in institutions, corruption perceptions

The region is dominantly marred by limited civil liberties. The only exception is Croatia, which has a high level of protection for freedom of expression and media, association and assembly. In fact, this state clearly stands out among the Western Balkans countries in all indicators of this domain. Croatia has been a member of the European Union since mid-2013. This meant also that sources used for this state are in large part different from other countries, which are still being annually evaluated in the EU Enlargement process. Although EU reports covering the state of the Rule of Law and human rights in Croatia have been critical, especially regarding media freedom, compared to the other six countries, Croatia has high scores. Serbia has the lowest score in sub-indicators consisting of three political freedoms and is the only state in the region with two freedoms assessed as restricted. The scores are given for countries as a whole, although one can differentiate between the capital and other parts of the country, as well as between two entities in BiH or Northern Kosovo from the rest of this territory.Four out of the seven countries and territories have problematic political pluralism. For Montenegro and North Macedonia, the score is lowered by high political polarisation which has blocked state institutions in throughout 2022. All countries are marked by adverse political competition and polarised political culture, but vary in degree in the observed period. Whether the opposition participated in democratic processes or the institutions were boycotted or blocked by an impasse was a factor used to delineate high from medium political polarization. In multi-ethnic countries such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, and Kosovo, inter-ethnic cleavages spill over to the political sphere. Societies and political organisations remain divided by ethnic lines. Apart from Serbia, also Albania and Kosovo have medium-level political polarisation.In 2022 only BiH and Serbia held general elections, while local elections for a number of municipalities were organized in Montenegro and Albania. Scores for Croatia, North Macedonia and Kosovo were given based on an evaluation of previously held elections by relevant international bodies such as OSCE/ODIHR. Only Croatia has both free and fair elections. Four countries have free elections, where the change of government is possible, but the process is marred by public officials’ campaigns, ruling party dominance or the influence of other actors on the will of the electorate. Elections in Serbia and BiH are evaluated as partly free, with weak electoral bodies perceived as biased. In BiH, the Office of the High Representative has even indirectly altered the popular will by changing rules for the post-electoral forming of institutions, while the outcome of the presidential race at the entity level of Republic Srpska was highly disputed.

Sub-indicators: Freedom of Expression, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Assembly

The level of socio-economic development of the region is rated as medium. This represents the expected result considering the average values of socio-economic development for four regional actors (Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia), two poor results (Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo), and only one high outcome (Croatia).The economic outlook of regional economies is mostly rated as intermediate, with one bad result (Kosovo) and only one good (Croatia). Nevertheless, the overall results should also be interpreted through the different contexts in which individual actors exist and operate, from Croatia, which has achieved a high degree of international economic integration (as a member of the European Union and the Eurozone), to actors that are not sufficiently integrated into regional and global financial markets (such as Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo). When predicting prospects, one should also consider the exposure of regional actors to external events such as the deterioration of global financial conditions leading to increased financing costs, a decrease in foreign demand, the war in Ukraine, and the existing energy crisis.The inequality-adjusted Human Development Index of economies in the region can be understood as high, globally. However, it should be kept in mind that regional actors (except Croatia) have an IHDI that is among the lowest in Europe.As for Economic Equity, none of the actors from the region meet the conditions for winning a high value of this sub-indicator. This data is not surprising when considering the significant unemployment rates and poverty levels in them. However, we should not ignore the fact that during 2022, unemployment in the observed entities declined to a historic minimum, according to World Bank data, which led to significant labour shortages in certain sectors.According to the used sources, corruption in the region is widespread. Except for Croatia and Montenegro, the level of corruption in the region ranges from medium to high and represents an important issue that has an impact on various aspects of people’s daily life.Bearing in mind the thesis that economic development and peace are often mutually reinforcing, improving the level of socio-economic development in the observed entities strengthens the resistance of societies to internal and external crises, increases the density of social cohesion among citizens, and positively affects their attitudes about the standard of living and happiness, which certainly improves the conditions for the establishment of positive peace in the region.

This indicator measures the basic components of the country’s economic performance. I1 consists of three pillars: basic economic performance, trade, and financial status. Sub-indicators GDP per capita (a standard measure of basic economic growth) Trade balance illustrates the openness and vulnerability of the economy Debt to GDP ratio indicates a country’s ability to pay its debts. A high level of debt basically inhibits the country’s ability to address its socioeconomic priorities. Measuring methodology: Quantitative datasets, content analysis Sources: World Bank, WTO, national trade administrations, trade data resources, IMF, Global Debt Database, national statistical offices

Equity has been one of the main values of sustainable development. It includes the provision of comparable opportunities for employment and social services. Sub-indicators IHDI (Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index): The IHDI considers not only the average achievements of a country in health, education, and income, but also how those achievements are distributed among its population by “discounting” each dimension’s average value according to its level of inequality. Unemployment (total unemployment, part-time employment, youth unemployment) Poverty (national poverty line) measures % of the population that lives below the national poverty line Wealth inequality is a measure of the distribution of wealth Measuring methodology: Quantitative datasets, subjective perception; The IHDI relies on data on income/consumption and years of schooling from major publicly available databases, Sources: Eurostat’s European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions, the Luxembourg Income Study, the World Bank’s IIDD, the United Nations Children’s Fund’s Multiple Indicators Cluster Survey, ICF Macro’s Demographic and Health Survey, United Nations University’s World Income Inequality Database, Global Population Review

This indicator basically relates to the efficiency of resource allocation. In societies with high levels of corruption, inefficient allocation of resources often leads to a reduction of funds for essential services which can further lead to dissatisfaction and civil unrest. Some of the relevant data: Control of Corruption captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain. TRACE Bribery Risk Matrix measures business bribery risk Public Sector Theft assesses perceptions of how often public sector employees steal or embezzle public property CPI – Corruption Perception Index Global Corruption Index … Measuring methodology: Quantitative datasets, content analysis Sources: World Bank, V-Dem, TRACE, Transparency International, Global Risk Profile

Infographic